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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal resulting from respondents' attempt 
to collect from the appellant its share of Court costs and 
attorney fees incurred during Third Party lawsuits. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court sitting without a jury, granted Sum-
mary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff respondents 
against the defendant appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seek to have the Trial Court's judgment 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Trial Court granted Summary Judgment against 
the Utah State Department of Finance, Administrator of 
the State Insurance Fund, in favor of several Plaintiffs 
and then consolidated all of the cases since the facts and 
issues of law were similar in all cases. This particular 
brief on appeal relates specifically to the Jeanette Walton 
and Boyd Simmons cases against the above named ap-
pellant. These two respondents agree generally with the 
statement of facts as outlined in appellant's brief, but in 
order to aid the Court in ruling in the Walton and Sim-
mons cases, the following statement of facts is hereby 
submitted. 
The claims involved in the Walton and Simmons cases 
are substantially identical as far as the facts involved. 
Both claims resulted from injuries suffered during falls 
on the same job site. The Walton Case involved a wrong-
ful death claim for the death of Robert Walton while the 
Simmons case involved a claim by Boyd Simmons for his 
personal injuries suffered from the fall (R. 12 Walton 
file; R. 10 Simmons file). The plaintiffs in both cases re-
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quested and received compensation payments from the 
defendant appellant (R. 13 Walton file; R. 10 Simmons 
file). In both cases the plaintiffs were successful in press-
ing claims against Third Parties and thereafter they paid 
the entire bill for Court costs and attorney fees incurred 
during the Third Party actions (R. 13 Walton file; R. 10 
Simmons file). The State Insurance Fund in both cases 
insisted that they were entitled to be reimbursed by both 
parties in full for the compensation that it had paid and 
also insisted that it was not required to pay its proportion-
ate obligation for the Court costs and attorney fees in-
curred in the Third Party actions (R. 2, 17 Walton file; 
R. 2, 15 Simmons file). Both respondents thereafter re-
imbursed the State Insurance Fund in full, under protest, 
with the express written understanding that they were 
reserving their rights to collect from the State Insurance 
Fund its proportionate obligation for the costs and at-
torney fees incurred in the Third Party actions (R. 13 
Walton file; R. 10 Simmons file). The State Insurance 
Fund was reimbursed by the Plaintiff in the Walton case 
on December 21, 1966, and it was reimbursed in the Sim-
mons case in January of 1967 (R. 13 Walton file; R. 11 
Simmons file). Thereafter the Plaintiffs demanded that 
the State Insurance Fund pay for its proportionate obli-
gation towards the costs and attorney fees as required by 
the provision of Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62 (1953 as 
amended), and as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Worthen vs. Shirtleff and Andrews, Inc., 19 Utah 2nd 
80, 426, P. 2d 223 (1967), but despite said demand the 
State Insurance Fund refused to recognize the above 
authorities and respondents were forced to file the suits, 
which are presently before this Court on Appeal (R. 13 
Walton file; R. 11 Simmons file). It is important to note 
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that in both the Walton and Simmons cases, suit was 
filed on January 20, 1969 (R. 1. Walton File; R. 1 Sim-
mons File). Since both suits were filed within three (3) 
years from the date the compensation carrier was reim-
bursed, neither the Walton nor the Simmons case can be 
barred by either a four year statute of limitations for con-
tracts not in writing or the three year statute of limita-
tions applicable to actions for liability created by statute. 
ANSWER TO POINT ONE 
APPELLANT MUST BEAR ITS PROPORTION-
ATE OBLIGATION FOR THE COSTS AND AT-
TORNEY FEES INCURRED IN SUCCESSFUL THIRD 
PARTY ACTIONS PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION 
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 35-1-62 (1953 AS 
AMENDED) AND AS CLARIFIED BY WORTHEN VS. 
SHIRTLEFF AND ANDREWS INC., 19 UTAH 2D 80, 
426 P. 2D 223 (1967). 
The appellant, while acknowledging the ruling of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Worthen, contends that Worthen 
should not be applied retroactively despite the fact that 
the Worthen case itself was applied retroactively. In that 
case, the Plaintiffs negotiated successfully a settlement 
for the Third Party at a time when the McConnell case 
was still the controlling law of the State, but this Court, 
refusing to recognize any retroactivity argument, held in 
effect that this settlement should be treated in the man-
ner that the legislature really intended the statute to 
mean and required the compensation carrier to pay its 
proportionate share of its obligation for the attorney fees, 
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despite the fact that no agreement had been entered into 
requiring such payment between the attorney and the 
compensation carrier. The general rule concerning the 
effect of decisions like Worthen was enunciated by Judge 
Phillips in Sun Ray Oil Company vs. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 147 F. 2d 962 (10th circuit 1945) and is 
certainly apropos to the instant case: 
"It is a general rule that the decision of the highest 
appellate Court of a jurisdiction overruling a former 
decision is restrospective in its operation. In effect, it 
declares that the former decision never was law." 
We refer the Court to the numerous cases cited in 10 
ALR 3rd 1371 which establish that the general rule in 
civil cases is that the judicial overruling of a precedent 
has both prospective and retroactive effect unless the 
overruling decision declares that it shall have only pro-
spective effect. The Supreme Court in Worthen made no 
such declaration that Worthen should have only prospec-
tive effect and therefore the plaintiffs involved in the 
Walton and Simmons cases are entitled to file their cases 
for costs and attorney fees and receive the same treat-
ment as far as the applicable law as did the plaintiff in 
the Worthen case. 
ANSWER TO POINT TWO 
THE RECORD IS ABSENT ANY EVIDENCE OF FACTS 
NECESSARY TO CREATE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
AGAINST RESPONDENTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Migliaccio vs. Davis et al., 
120 Utah 1, 232 P. 2d 195 (1951) recognized the general 
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rule of Equitable Estoppel as set forth in the following 
language: 
" ' * * * Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the 
principal by which a party who knows or should 
know the truth is absolutely precluded, both at law 
and in equity, from denying or asserting the con-
trary of, any material fact, which by his words or 
conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or 
through culpable negligence, he has induced an-
other, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts 
and who had a right to rely upon such words and 
conduct, to believe and act upon them thereby, as a 
consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing 
his position in such a way that he would suffer injury 
if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed. ' " 
The record is absent any evidence in either the Walton 
or the Simmons case, of any detrimental reliance by the 
State Insurance Fund upon any words or conduct by 
either of the respondents. In fact, the answers to both the 
Walton Complaint as well as the Simmons Complaint, 
admit that the complainants in both cases reimbursed the 
State Insurance Fund under protest with the express 
written understanding that the said payments were being 
made under protest and respondents would pursue their 
right to be reimbursed for the attorney fees and Court 
costs that the State Insurance Fund was obligated to pay. 
Appellant's only reliance in either of these cases, if any, 
was based on its own mistaken assumption of what the 
law was as far as its obligation for costs and attorney fees. 
We know of no law in existence which gives birth to an 
estoppel merely because a party relies upon its own mis-
taken interpretation of what the law is. 
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ANSWER TO POINT THREE 
RESPONDENTS IN BOTH THE WALTON AND SIM-
MONS CASES FILED TIMELY CLAIMS WITHIN 
THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE THE STATE IN-
SURANCE FUND WAS REIMBURSED. 
Appellant in Point Three of its brief erroneously con-
tends that plaintiffs claims are barred by either a four 
( 4) or a three (3) year statute of limitations. The ap-
pellant contends first that the four ( 4) year statute of 
limitations pertaining to oral contracts should not be ap-
plied but that the limitation period of three (3) years for 
actions for liability based on a State statute should be ap-
plicable. Regardless of which limitation period the trial 
court applied or which statute the Supreme Court holds 
is applicable, the claims filed by Walton and Simmons 
are not barred. In the instant cases the limitation period 
would begin to run from the date the compensation 
carrier was reimbursed. The appellant in Walton was re-
imbursed on December 21, 1966, while the carrier in Sim-
mons was reimbursed in the latter part of January of 
1967. In both cases suit was filed on January 20, 1969, 
within three years from the date the appellant was re-
imbursed and therefore neither claim is barred by either 
a three (3) or four ( 4) years statute. The same rationale 
applies to the three (3) year limitation period provided 
for under the provisions of the Utah Code Annotated sec-
tion 35-1-99 for actions for compensation under work-
men's compensation laws. 
We would argue for the benefit of the other respond-
ents involved in this case that this Court should apply the 
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principle that when two or more statutes of limitation 
may apply to a given fact situation the longest period of 
limitation should be preferred. The Court in Juab Coun-
ty, Dept. of Public Welfare vs. Summers, 19 Utah 2d 49, 
426 P. 2d 1 ( 1967) made it quite clear that it would apply 
the Statute of Limitations which would uphold an action 
rather than defeat it if there were doubts as to which 
limitation period applied. (see also Harding Co., Inc., vs. 
Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 226 P. 2d 49 (1954). 
ANSWER TO POINT FOUR 
THE CLAIMS IN THE INSTANT CASES DO NOT IN-
VOLVE ACTIONS AGAINST ANY EMPLOYER, OF-
FICER, AGENT, OR EMPLOYEE FOR INJURIES SUS-
TAINED BY AN EMPLOYEE AND THEREFORE THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 35-
1-60 (1953) ARE INAPPLICABLE. 
The instant cases merely involve actions by claimants 
for reimbursement from the State Insurance Fund for 
costs and attorney fees which the State Insurance Fund 
is obligated to pay pursuant to the provision of section 
35-1-62. They in no way involve actions by employees for 
injuries sustained during the course of employment 
against any employer, officer, agent, or employee. It is 
obvious from reading the case of Worthen vs. Shirtleff, 
supra that claimants are not obligated to first have such 
claims presented to and denied by the Industrial Commis-
sion before they can bring these claims to Court. The 
spurious attempt to relate the subject matter contained 
in Utah Code Ann. 35-1-60, 1953 as amended with the 
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claims filed in the instant cases should be rejected 
summarily. 
ANSWER TO POINT FIVE 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE THE REAL PARTIES IN 
INTEREST SINCE THEY HAVE PAID ALL COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN THE THIRD 
PARTY LAWSUITS. 
In the instant case the respondents have each paid their 
attorney, Donn E. Cassity, the agreed upon attorney fee 
as well as the Court costs and because of said payment 
they are entitled to be reimbursed from the State Insur-
ance Fund as the real party in interest and are entitled 
to the proportionate share that the appellant is obligated 
to pay pursuant to the provision of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 35-1-62 ( 1953 as amended). This Court on a 
previous appeal in the case of Worthen vs. Shirtleff and 
Andrews Inc., supra, held that where each of the parties 
have a right to bring the action and one take the initative 
and obtains the recovery for the benefit for both, it is 
only fair that each bear its share of the expenses neces-
sarily incurred in doing so. In the instant case the re-
spondents have assumed the entire obligation and are en-
titled to be reimbursed by the appellants. 
Appellants "real party in interest" defense should 
also be rejected summarily for the reason that appellants 
have no standing to assert such a defense. In the instant 
case the respondents elected to pay their attorney and 
later obtain reimbursement from the State Insurance 
Fund. The only parties who would have standing under 
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such a transaction to assert such a defense would either 
be the respondents or their attorney, Donn E. Cassity, 
both of whom have elected to proceed in the name of the 
respective respondents. 
ANSWER TO POINT SIX 
A FINDING OF MERE DELAY WITHOUT SHOWING 
THAT SAID DELAY HAS INEQUITABLY PREJ-
UDICED THE APPELLANT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
LA CHES. 
The appellants in answer to respondents complaint as-
serted the bare defense of Laches based entirely upon the 
ground of mere delay. The Supreme Court of Utah in 
Mawhinney vs. Jensen 120 Utah 142, 232 P. 2d 769, 773 
( 1951) discussed the following legal considerations 
necessary to create a finding of laches: 
"The Equitable doctrine of laches is founded upon 
considerations of time and injury. 'Laches in legal 
significance is not mere delay, but delay that works 
a disadvantage to another.' Pomeroy's Equity Juris-
prudence, 4th Ed. Section 1442; Chase vs. Chase, 20 
R.I. 202, 37 A. 804. ***The question of laches can only 
be determined under the circumstances of each case 
and there must be a finding that the delay has in-
equitably prejudiced the defendant before the rem-
edy is barred." 
In the instant case, the record is absent any evidence 
that the delay in any way had inequitably prejudiced the 
State Insurance Fund and therefore under the holding of 
the Court in Mawhinney vs. Jensen, supra the defense of 
laches must fall. 
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ANSWER TO POINT SEVEN 
THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED SECTION 35-1-62 (1953 AS AMENDED) AS 
INTERPRETED BY THE COURT IN WORTHEN VS. 
SHIRTLEFF, SUPRA OBLIGATE THE APPELLANT 
TO PAY ITS PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN THE 
THIRD PARTY ACTIONS. 
The appellant contends without any evidence in the rec-
ord in support thereof, that "in light of the costs and prob-
lems raised by Worthen" the Court may wish to reject 
the holding of the Worthen case. We disagree. The Court 
in Worthen found that the above statute with unmistake-
able clarity required that the expenses and attorney fees 
should be charged proportionately against the injured 
party and the compensation carrier as their interest ap-
pear. The appellant's attemt to reargue the Worthen case 
through faulted logic is more in the nature of a belittled 
petition for a rehearing after a previous appeal in which 
all of the issues presented here were resolved. We ask the 
Court to reject such a contention in accordance with the 
approach taken in Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Association vs. Saint Paul Insurance Co. 22 Utah 2d 70, 
448 P. 2d 724 (1968). 
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CONCLUSION 
The record is clear that respondents reimbursed the 
appellant in full under protest with the express under-
standing that they would expect the appellant to pay its 
share of the costs and attorney fees incurred in the third 
party lawsuits. Respondents' claims in both cases were 
filed timely within three years from the date payment 
was made to appellant. There is nothing in the record 
except mere lapse of time and appellant's own mistaken 
interpretation of the law to support the defenses based 
on laches and estoppel. The record lacks any evidence of 
injury to the appellant or any inducement by the re-
spondents which appellant relied on to its detriment. In 
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